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THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
Strategy is the art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a nation -or coalition of nations -including its armed forces, to the end that its vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential or merely presumed.
 Edward Meade Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy (1943)
The problem with national security strategy documents is that they often create the false impression that strategy formulation is a rational and systemic process. In fact, strategy formulation both within the executive branch and between the executive branch and Congress is an intensely political process from which national strategy emerges after protracted bargaining and compromise. Key personalities do what they can agree to do.
 Earl H. Tilford, US Strategic Studies Institute (1995)
The National Security Strategy (NSS) is really bundles of security, economic and political strategies based on assumptions about how best to advance national security and build international order. 1 It encompasses both planning for the use of the various implements of state power and attention to the domestic policies needed to produce and maintain them over the long-run. 2 What inevitably happens within the government is that administrations pursue a mix of policies and strategies to attain a consensual NSS. 3 In the past our Nation's Grand Strategy revolved around how the Administration, specifically the President, viewed the world and at its essence was his vision for the place that However, over the past seventeen years since the creation of the Congressional law (the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, United States Code 50, Section 104a) that established the requirement for the NSS, the NSS has met with varied success in dealing with our adversaries, our allies, and our nation's future. 4 Additionally, the NSS has a profound impact on defense acquisition policies and the emphasis the nation places upon cooperation with its allies and friends. 5 It is extremely important for military leaders to understanding the origin and the process of developing the NSS, especially in light of September 11, 2001 and our on-going War on Terrorism, because the NSS affects the direction that the nation takes, and indirectly the course of the world.
What is the origin of the NSS? How is it developed by each Administration? Is developing it, as stated by Earl H. Tilford, an intensely political process?
The purpose of this paper is to explore the origins and the developmental process of the NSS, and then make several recommendations for improving the NSS developmental process.
THE ORIGIN OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
Throughout history nations did not make a habit of publishing their grand strategy prior to pursuing it. The very thought of practicing a policy that would make a nation's grand strategy public would have surprised Metternich, Bismarck and Lord Salisbury. The fundamental, strategic nature of the NSS is threefold: one, it furnishes a historical perspective to past strategic structure; two, it delineates the interest of the United States; three, it analyzes the threat and objectives of the United States, and the means to achieve these objectives. 16 The prerequisites for the NSS transmittal to Congress are contained in Section 104a of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, United States Code 50.
(1) The President shall transmit to Congress each year a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States (hereinafter in this section referred to as a ''national security strategy report'').
(2) The national security strategy report for any year shall be transmitted on the date on which the President submits to Congress the budget for the next fiscal year under section 1105 of title 31.
(3) Not later than 150 days after the date, on which a new President takes office, the President shall transmit to Congress a national security strategy report under this section. That report shall be in addition to the report for that year transmitted at the time specified in paragraph (2).
(b) Contents
Each national security strategy report shall set forth the national security strategy of the United States and shall include a comprehensive description and discussion of the following:
(1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States.
(2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States.
(3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1) . (4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy.
(5) Such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States. 17 The bottom line of 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act is that Congress amended the National Security Act of 1947 to require an annually written articulation of the nation's grand strategy from each succeeding President. Congress's rational behind the edict was that the Executive Branch had more often than not failed to formulate, in an integrated and coherent manner, the judicious use of resources drawn from all the elements of national power, a mid-and long-term strategy necessary to defend and further vital national interests. was the political theme of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. 21 Furthermore Congress wanted some sort of means to link the national strategic vision to the annual Presidential budget, 22 which is why the Executive Branch is tasked to report the NSS early each year, so that it can then be followed on by the resources requested in the administration's annual budget submission. 23 In theory, a coherent and effective NSS would efficiently align and balance the strategic ends, ways, and means in pursuit of our national interests in consonance with our social values.
The NSS, like Grand Strategy, has been defined as the art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. It encompasses national defense, foreign relations, and economic relations and assistance; and aims, among other objectives, at providing a favorable foreign relations position, and a defense posture capable of defeating hostile action. 24 National security strategy, or "grand strategy," is the art and science of developing, integrating, and deploying the political, economic, diplomatic, military, informational, and other instruments of national power and influence to secure political objectives in peace and war. A national security strategy seeks to counter real or potential threats to a state's interests, values, or survival. This focus on perceived threats differentiates a security strategy from a state's general foreign and domestic policy initiatives. National security strategy should also be distinguished from military strategy or doctrine. As Clausewitz recognized, military strategy should flow from, and be subordinate to, overall national security policy goals, even if the resultant potential for political interference in military planning and operations can often be frustrating for those in uniform. 27 As it turns out, Earl H. Tilford was correct in his assessment that the NSS development is an "intensely political process". The main reason for this is that the NSS is a product of an interagency system, in which the NSC plays the central role and has numerous interactions with other government procedures that introduce painful iterations. 28 The congressionally mandated NSS document, which bears the President's signature and is supposed to be produced annually as an indicator of an administration's direction in national security and foreign policy. The NSS is also eagerly awaited because it is the best example of "purposeful adaptation" by the American government to changing global realities and responsibilities. It expresses the US strategic vision, what the US stands for in the world, its priorities, and a sensing of how the instruments of national power, (diplomatic, economic, military and informational) will be arrayed. Since it is truly an interagency product, the NSS also serves to discipline the interagency system to understand the President's agenda and priorities, and develops a common language that gives coherence to policy within an administration. It is also more than a strategic document. It is political, designed to enhance the presidential authority in order to mobilize the nation. Finally, the NSS tends to document rather than drive the policy initiatives, which is especially true in election years. 29 Through my research and after reviewing each NSS, I found this to be exactly the case -that each administration's final NSS is merely a reiteration of the administration's accomplishments.
There are several issues that complicate the process of developing the NSS. The term national security strategy implies a planned, systematic, and rational process, where a consideration of national interests, values, and priorities decides policy objectives, and an analysis of available resources, and the external security environment determines the strategy to achieve these objectives. However, in practice, strategy making is rarely so straightforward. The security implications of trends in the international environment can be difficult to interpret and analyze; leading to the kind of strategic drift that characterized Western security policies following the end of the Cold War. Strategies often develop incrementally as a result of compromises between the conflicting interest groups involved in decision making. They are also shaped by strong leaders, organizational cultures, and governmental structures. In some states, economic policy alone can drive the whole security strategy process. Unforeseen events will also tend to upset the most rigorous planning, causing the distinct stages in a sequential process of strategic analysis, choice, and implementation to overlap. 33 The first and most obvious effort of each administration is to formulate and codify its preferred approach to national security.
shows the various forces and trends that effect an administration as it establishes its approach to and creation of its national security strategy. FIGURE 1.
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The overall process of initiating, controlling, developing, writing, and publishing the NSS is owned and resides with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, who also heads/leads the NSC staff. 36 The main part of the NSC staff that deals with the NSS is known as the Executive Secretariat and varies in size and function from administration to administration. 37 The NSS is used to create intellectual consensus vetted through the election campaign and party platform. It is carved from a consensus view of the nation and the world within the Executive Branch, but its main flaw is that it must speak to so many audiences. The NSS process is started by a National Security Decision memo from the President and designates which cabinet departments will participate in the formulation of the NSS. Usually the first National Security Directive (NSD) or National Security Memorandum (NSM) from the President lays out how the NSC will work. The functions and operations of the NSC change from administration to administration and sometimes within administrations. The NSS is processed under the organizational structure of the NSC and above all it is a political document and Presidential agenda. 38 In addition to the governmental actors with formal responsibility in the policy process, interest groups and public opinion directly affect the substance of the NSS. 39 However, regardless of the variety of political actors involved in national security policy, the focal point is fixed on the presidency. It is the quality and capability of the person in the Oval Office that determines the success or failure of U.S. national security policy and strategy. 40 There are four important factors to a systematic study of the development of the NSS and all of them center on the President. First, the President's leadership style, his personality and character as critical determinants of how the Oval Office functions with respect to national security policy and process. Second, how the President views the powers and limitations of the office and how he sees his role in furthering its prestige and power. Third, the President's mindset (view of the world) regarding U.S. national interests and the international security environment and how these affect the national security policies and strategic posture his administration attempts to put into place. Lastly, the President's ability to bring the first three components to bear upon the National Security Establishment so as to synthesize and integrate its efforts toward coherent policy and relevant options.
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Each Administration designs the decision-making system of the NSC to fit the needs and desires of the new President and his style of leadership/management. 42 The basic NSS formulation process starts with someone on the NSC staff setting out, in the name of the President, to task the Cabinet officials and their strategy-minded deputies, to articulate the preferred NSS for the United States. What follows is an iterative, interagency process of some months (or years depending on the administration) culminating in multiple drafts and several high level meetings, including the NSC, to resolve differences and ultimately approve the final version of the NSS. 43 One of the most useful ways for a new administration to start the NSS formulation process is to begin with an analysis of the ideas contained in the last administration's NSS to the new administration's campaign statements and to the new policies it desires to pursue. 44 The most important thing to remember about each NSS is that they are macro level documents that take much interagency planning to develop and result from intensive interaction among agencies. 45 Because there are no formalized decision criteria or standard formats for issuing strategic guidance, the thoroughness and quality of that guidance varies substantially from NSS to NSS, and from administration to administration (and sometimes within administrations). One of the main problems with the NSS is that the resultant product reflects a process that lacks both standardized structure and a set of relevant factors to be considered and communicated before committing US elements of power. 46 Additionally the quality of the NSS depends on how willing
Presidential administrations decide to be frank and forthcoming with Congress and the American people. Over the years most administrations have interpreted Congress's mandate loosely. Former President Bill Clinton's first NSS reportedly went through 21 drafts before it was finally submitted a year and a half late. 47 The most crucial element of the entire NSS development process is that even if people at the Executive pinnacle try to formulate a national strategy, fragmentation may still result and where they fail to do so, fragmentation will be inevitable. 48 So then the question is what should the nation do to improve the developmental process of the NSS?
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY PROCESS
The United States Commission on National Securtiy / 21 st Century was correct in 2000
with their assessment that "The time for reexamination (of the NSS) is now…" 49 This call for a change in how the nation develops its national strategy is based on the fact that although
Congress requires the Executive Branch to submit a NSS, few administrations have used the document to seriously re-examine America's role in the world. 50 One issue feeding the winds of change is that of consistency of our national strategy brought about by the fact that unless a President succeeds himself or is followed by a like-minded leader, an end-of-term NSS will usually find its way quickly onto the garbage heap of history because it has little useful value other than to document accomplishments of the outgoing administration. 51 Most importantly is the realization that what President, in a fast-paced, media-oriented world wants to articulate once a year, in a static, written report a detailed statement of his forward-looking strategic vision? 52 The United States is in the world to stay. Whether they like it or not, US citizens cannot withdraw from external responsibilities, nor can they retreat to the isolation of the early twentieth century. Regardless of the policies of any administration, the US has links to most parts of the world -politically, economically, culturally, and psychologically. What the US does or does not do has an impact on international politics. Additionally, many national security issues cannot be isolated from domestic policy either. 53 The most evolved democracy in the world has the most cumbersome national security decision-making process. Inefficiency is the price the founding fathers imposed for democratic accountability. But some of the inefficiency is the result of American strategic culture, with its multiplicity of players, plentiful but diffused resources, and the propensity to segment peace and diplomacy from war and military power. Frederick the Great cautioned: "Diplomacy without arms is music without instruments." So did John F.
Kennedy: "Diplomacy and defense are not substitutes for one another. Either alone would fail."
Major structural changes must be made in the interagency system in order to harness human talent and resources intelligently. It is time to revise the 1947 NSC system and the 1986 NSS process and move to one for the 21 st Century. 54 Structural and procedural changes are not enough for successful national security policy.
Also needed is a focus that provides coherent visions of national interests, clarity of national security policy, and clear directions to the design of strategy. By exercising effective leadership and by providing a sense of purpose and vision in articulating national interests, the President can shape the boundaries, determine the directions, and establish the critical points to map out US national security strategy. 55 I fully agree with the Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security / 21 st Century "Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change" which recommends that the Executive Branch should establish a National Security Service Corps (NSSC) to enhance civilian career paths, and to provide a corps of policy experts with broad-based experience throughout the Executive Branch. 56 The NSSC is needed to create a historical knowledge core within the Executive Branch to assist in standardizing the NSS process because the current ad hoc system of formulating strategic guidance is clearly not conducive to producing strategies appropriate to our foreign policy initiatives or responses to crises. Furthermore the entire Executive Branch's policymaking apparatus must continue to refine its strategic planning system if the NSS is to become a streamlined process. 57 The NSS is so essential to achieving national objectives, especially in our current environment, that it portends an even greater need for complete and comprehensive strategic guidance and supports the adoption of a standard format. Strategic guidance should provide elements of information that the appropriate government departments and agencies need if they are to take coordinated action and achieve the desired strategic objectives. These elements become apparent from an analysis of the theoretical requirements for directing strategic action, from the considerations and rationale for engagement outlined in the NSS. 58 The National Security Act of 1947 needs to be amended to give the NSC increased powers to force other government agencies to quickly focus their efforts on the development of a timely and relevant NSS. By not having these powers the NSC will continued to be hampered by a politicized and bureaucratic system that does not produce the NSS in a timely manner, which jeopardizes our National Military Strategy (NMS), contingency planning guidance, our Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, and Combatant Commander's operations plans.
Terry L. Deibel, of the National Defense University, proposed a need for a NSS that stressed the importance of pragmatisms and continuity. His argument is based on the fact that baring significant events like September 11, 2001 , our national interests change little over time,
he stated, new administrations should be assembling their NSS from policies that succeeded in previous administrations. 59 After reviewing all thirteen NSS, (Reagan 1987 Bush 1990 Bush , 1991 Bush & 1993 Clinton 1994 Clinton , 1995 Clinton , 1996 Clinton , 1997 Clinton , 1998 Clinton , 1999 What is required most in every NSS is that it must ensure that our national ends be consciously related to means and that the national interest overseas is carefully defined. The task would be far easier if the President uses the language of national strategy and explicitly builds his prospective policy on the successes of all of his recent predecessors. 60 This may well be the case in each and every one of past NSS, but each is certainly tainted with political party rhetoric and spins. Gabriel Marcella, in her work National Security and the Interagency Process summed it up best when she stated that the complex challenges to national security in the 21 st Century will require intelligent integration of resources and unity of effort within the government. It is also imperative that changes be made to make the system and the process more effective. 61 My recommendations for improving the NSS process are the following.
• The Goldwater-Nichols Act should be amended to instruct the Executive Branch that the NSS should not be changed from a previous administration's version unless that previous version is not achieving the national interests or a radical change in the national direction (the War on Terrorism) is required. This is for the sake of the entire nation and its steady direction along a single global and domestic path. NSS policies that are effective and productive for the nation should not be changed and should continue for the overall benefit of the nation.
• The Goldwater-Nichols Act should be amended to instruct the Executive Branch that the NSS should be thought of as the overarching national plan and be tied in with the State of the Union . Ideally the State of the Union should be the President's verbal expression of what is contained in the NSS.
• The Goldwater-Nichols Act should be amended to change the requirement for a yearly NSS to only one at the beginning of each administration, due no later than October of the inauguration year. The rational for this is that the NSS should be a plan to give overall vision, direction and guidance to the nation. The main NSS document should not change within administrations. If minor changes are required then they should be issued as Presidential policy/directives/memorandum as issues arise.
• The Goldwater-Nichols Act should be amended to fully implement the U.S.
Commission on National Security / 21 st Century recommendation for the establishment of a National Security Service Corps.
• The Goldwater-Nichols Act should be amended to instruct the Executive Branch that the NSS should include domestic programs and policies. This requirement is essential because a nation cannot achieve its goals if its foreign and domestic strategies are not synchronized. The NSS should not be a solely "foreign policy statement" but a total focus on all issues, both foreign and domestic that effect our national interests.
CONCLUSION
After seventeen years and many different versions, the NSS has become a critical part of American politics and policy. Its origin is well known and understood by both Congress and the Executive Branch. Additionally, both seem to understand and appreciate the importance of an established NSS for each administration and for the nation. The process of how to develop the NSS is another story altogether. Many believe that the NSS has fallen short of the expectations held by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and it should not come as a surprise because every Presidential administration views Congress as a competitor, rather than a partner, even when the same party controls both. Additionally, an administration's early NSS efforts may also serve the political purpose of differentiating a new government from its predecessor. 62 As a result, information about a critical subject like national security is power; pure raw power -and the stakes are high. 63 This being said, the nation still needs this critical document because a great power such as the United States cannot afford to send mixed messages about its intentions, whether to its allies, to its competitors, or to its adversaries. 64 
